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Abstract
About half the planet's carbon dioxide emissions originate in urban areas: the cities and suburbs where a
growing majority of humanity lives. To survive this century, we'll have to live together in new ways. Few issues
are as fundamental to climate politics as this one. And few are as visceral: the urban is rapidly becoming one of
the chief terrains of twenty-first century struggle.
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The Urban Green
Wars
by Daniel Aldana Cohen
Struggling for working-class control of cities is
crucial to bringing down carbon emissions.
Public housing in Paris. Laurent Kronental
This article is part of a Jacobin symposium on Naomi
Klein’s This Changes Everything.
About half the planet’s carbon dioxide emissions originate in urban
areas: the cities and suburbs where a growing majority of humanity
lives. To survive this century, we’ll have to live together in new
ways. Few issues are as fundamental to climate politics as this one.
And few are as visceral: the urban is rapidly becoming one of the
chief terrains of twenty-!rst-century struggle.
But the politics of slashing urban emissions and transforming
urban regions are one of the great question marks of the current
climate debate, especially on the Left. Peppy technocrats dominate
discussion of cities and carbon, while leftists struggle to articulate
the link between climate and already-existing urban politics.
Naomi Klein’s bestselling book This Changes Everything:
Capitalism vs the Climate (TCE) is no exception. The tome details
the joint threats of climate change and capitalism and argues that
only a wide-ranging coalition of grassroots movements can tackle
them both.
But what is the role of cities and of urban movements in tackling
the climate crisis? How can the kind of far-reaching carbon analytic
that she brings to global trade and commodity chains be extended
into the urban fabric? How should we connect volatile, mobilized
city politics to the climate crisis?
To be sure, the urban appears throughout TCE. In Klein’s various
summaries of the basic changes needed for a just and livable low-
carbon future, the urban dominates. So too in her list of
“comprehensive policies and programs that make low-carbon
choices easy and convenient for everyone.” She cites public transit;
“aﬀordable, energy-e#cient housing along those transit lines,”
smart density, bike lines, the clustering of urban services, and pro-
pedestrian reforms.
It’s “no mystery,” Klein writes in another section, that transit
systems, citywide composting, and “urban redesigns” must be the
focus of public spending. She cites Canadian unionist Sam Gindin’s
assertion that “urban infrastructure will have to be reinvented,”
and calls on the climate movement to complete the un!nished
twentieth-century battle for “basic public services that work, for
decent housing,” citing at once Scandinavia’s exemplary social
democracy and Stockholm’s “visionary urban design.”
But while Klein clearly recognizes that overhauling cities and
broader processes of urbanization are central, she doesn’t detail
the politics of these imperatives.
Of course, even a book about everything has to make choices. No
one can actually cover everything. And yet, for Klein’s broader
purposes, the omissions of urban climate politics feels like a missed
opportunity. A left urban climate politics would extend and deepen
two of Klein’s overarching arguments — that the !ght to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions needs to be integrated with a broader
suite of social justice demands, and that a focus on “non-reformist
reforms” could strategically link urgent short-term campaigns
with a long-term transformative strategy.
Why Cities Matter
The numbers on cities’ central role in climate change are clear. And
urban planning can slash these emissions as part of a bold program
of non-reformist reforms.
Start with the carbon. The New Urbanist planner Peter Calthorpe
calculates that the United States, through a combined program of
energy conservation and pro-density planning, could achieve half
of the emissions reductions needed for the country to do its share
in keeping global warming at 2 degrees Celsius. Against planners’
estimates that $20 trillion will be invested in the country’s urban
fabric in the next two decades, this kind of urban transformation is
no idle fantasy.
The same logic holds for the world as a whole. A thorough 2014
study by the Cities Center at the London School of Economics
found that if 724 of the biggest cities worldwide engaged in more
compact planning, they could cut emissions by an average of nearly
a third by 2030. That would save a cumulative 14.4 gigatons of
carbon. That’s equivalent to three-!fths of the carbon stored in
presently retrievable reserves in the Alberta tar sands. And a 30
percent reduction is a timid, conservative goal — deeper cuts are
possible with more money and political energy.
Meanwhile, the more aggressively urban emissions are slashed, the
less energy needs to be wired into cities to keep them running,
reducing the burden on the renewable energy sector to meet all our
energy demand at a level that keeps growing.
Klein cites a few studies that claim we could meet those needs with
renewables by 2030 just by building them out aggressively. But this
is more of a placeholder idea than a plan. Most energy experts
doubt our ability to meet projected energy demands with
renewables alone, at least on that time scale. We need to use energy
far, far more e#ciently. And that is precisely what smart
densi!cation in cities and suburbs could achieve.
At this level, the relationship between cities and carbon might
seem abstract and bloodless. No wonder low-carbon policy is
dominated by technocrats, eco-modernists, apolitical urban
planners, faceless global institutes, and even oil majors. Yes, Shell
Oil has a project on the low-carbon virtues of urban densi!cation.
But socially and politically, everything is up for grabs when it
comes to transforming the urban form and urban social relations.
One way or another, there will be a whole new landscape for our
everyday lives, from getting to work to chasing dates to mounting a
massive protest to buying bread and sneakers.
And these big changes are coming fast. As Klein points out, the
window for gradually decarbonizing our economy is already shut.
Countries and companies should have started earlier, but in the era
of neoliberal restructuring, they didn’t.
As we saw in Greece, when rulers decide that it’s necessary to keep
the system running, they’re perfectly capable of squeezing the
consumption of basics by the many while leaving untouched the
luxury consumption of the few.
Klein is of course aware of this. She made a version of this
argument in her previous book, The Shock Doctrine, which
documents a vast array of cases in which elites chose to grind down
the economy to reset power relations. No one should assume that
elites are unwilling to pause economic growth when it suits their
interest.
The question is how rich countries, and their urban regions, can cut
their consumption in a democratic and egalitarian way. Klein’s
argument — shared with thinkers like Juliet Schor, Gus Speth, and
Tim Jackson — is that we need to expand those areas of social life,
like care work and leisure, that improve our quality of life. All this
while more materially intensive, but less socially useful, sectors are
wound down.
It’s a persuasive argument. Rich people’s consumption of useless
crap needs to be dramatically curtailed while the consumption
standards of those at the bottom need to be raised. The only
sustainable way for poor people to consume more is for the wealthy
to consume less. (No small task given our success so far in taxing
the 0.1 percent’s wealth.)
But we don’t live (and produce and consume) in the numeric space
of income and expenditures; we live amidst bricks and bridges. It’s
in urban regions that, for most people in the world, everyday life
needs to get better for a transformative climate politics to win
widespread support. Transforming urban life is both a method for
slashing emissions and the prize for getting it right.
Right to the City
This brings us to the gritty politics of low-carbon urbanism. Klein
notes in passing that the protestors in Rio de Janeiro demanding
lower bus fares might not think of themselves as low-carbon
protagonists, but they are anyway. She’s right. But why stop at bus
protests?
We need to go further. Movements that advocate decent aﬀordable
housing near jobs or services — these are also accidental low-
carbon protagonists. The carbon argument is that public or tightly
regulated housing that is low-cost or free, and that is near the
stores and services that residents need and use, is the most energy-
e#cient arrangement that you can have in a city. Every urbanist
and their iPad knows that intelligent densi!cation reduces energy
use by virtue of larger, more e#cient buildings. And reduced travel
distances diminish car use, whether in favor of walking, cycling, or
bussing.
What’s usually forgotten is that, historically, the movements
battling for this kind of urban arrangement have been movements
of the poor and working class. And in the present, these
movements remain the most dedicated champions not just of raw
residential density, but of pairing that density with the kinds of
public institutions — from libraries to basketball courts — that
make shared urban space into an accessible, enjoyable, and
unpredictable exchange of meanings, and not just material goods.
Planners write books about walkable neighborhoods. Working-
class communities take to the streets for them.
And the struggles in pursuit of that agenda, while rarely waged in
terms of carbon or climate change, are some of the most vibrant of
this century. All across the world, housing-focused movements
have served as anchors for a global right-to-the-city movement
that’s been raging in electoral contests, in public debates, and in
the public squares to make daily life more bearable — and more
democratic.
These twenty-!rst century urban revolts — from Durban to
Istanbul — are crystallizing these demands and defying the
!nance-real estate nexus. They have convulsed urban areas
worldwide.
This isn’t an empty leftist boast. In 2013, the Economist Intelligence
Unit wrote that this wave of urban protest was systematically
diminishing the livability of the world’s great cities. To paraphrase
the former Greek !nance minister Yanis Varoufakis, urban social
movements should wear that magazine’s loathing as a badge of
honor.
Put another way, these movements’ urban banners, always
anchored by housing, are at once short- and long-termist. The
“right to the city” battle, as so many movements describe it, is for
“non-reformist reforms” that yield immediate improvements to
the quality of life, while challenging the rule of capital by !ghting
to raise wages, take land and housing oﬀ the market, and expand
public services. This is precisely the kind of social justice agenda
that Klein broadly supports.
So why is the link between housing-anchored struggles, slashing
carbon, and rebalancing the economy missing from TCE?
Perhaps one reason is that although housing struggles’ victories
would deliver a major climate payoﬀ, the relationship is indirect.
Taken in aggregate, the cutting edge of carbon footprint research
on cities supports the claims that I’m making here. Careful,
technically sophisticated consumption-based studies of urban
carbon footprints show that density is better than sprawl; they also
show that high levels of consumer spending associated with the
professional class dilute the bene!ts of density. Mixed-use,
democratic neighborhoods with jobs and services nearby are the
low-carbon gold standard.
In New York, for instance, the best balance of low-emissions and
livability are found in dense, multi-class neighborhoods anchored
by aﬀordable housing, much of it public. (I’ll be publishing a map
organizing this data next fall in an Atlas of New York.) By focusing
on cultural amenities and access to the wild beyond, we can bring a
version of these virtues to suburbs.
We also know that by trimming work hours, we can expand the
pursuit of low-carbon leisure — namely, having fun without eating
huge steaks, buying $5 shirts that won’t last a week, or getting in a
car. A dollar spent on a movie ticket yields far fewer carbon
emissions than a dollar spent on clothing or automobile
transportation.
The most intuitive and elegant articulation of these !ndings can be
found in a 2010 essay by radical urbanist Mike Davis called “Who
Will Build the Ark?”. Davis argues that “the cornerstone of the
low-carbon city, far more than any particular green design or
technology, is the priority given to public a$uence over private
wealth.” Namely, public housing, public plazas, public transit,
public handball courts, and so on — amenities made public both by
physical design and collective, energetic social use.
But again, we lack the carefully tailored studies, and the beautifully
rendered infographics, to quantify and dramatize the relationships
described above in clear and simple terms. It has been easier for
more technocratic planning types to follow the carbon in more
quantitatively complex but socially limited ways, fetishizing
density and walkability without exploring their politics.
Meanwhile, climate justice activists focus on fossil fuel
infrastructures beyond cities, or racialized, poor communities
vulnerable to extreme weather within city limits. Within cities, the
overlap between greening and gentri!cation, and between
“revitalization” and mass displacement, has understandably
caused enormous suspicion among housing advocates of any low-
carbon agenda.
After all, the con%uence of various forms of greening and the
increasing polarization of land and housing markets isn’t exactly a
coincidence. The !nance-real estate nexus of cities like New York
has sought to attract highly educated workers by turning much of
the urban terrain into quasi-exclusive, ecologically themed arenas
for conspicuous, feel-good consumption. Most of what is labeled
“sustainable” in these settings isn’t.
For capital, the stakes of aligning the interests of sustainability (as
brand if not fact), land use, and the productivity of elite workers is
high. There are huge pro!ts to be won by real estate interests and
their !nancial partners — if, that is, ecological virtues remain
privatized. As David Harvey argues, the politics of housing are
fought over a terrain of primary strategic importance to global
capital. There’s a reason why social movements struggle to win big
there, and why multi-class alliances are needed to beat back the
great power of !nance and real estate.
There’s another barrier to the broad embrace of an aﬀordable
housing–anchored low-carbon urban politics. Precisely because
luxury city policies have at once corrupted and promoted the idea
of collective consumption — in which well-heeled professionals
take up cycling, walking, local economic vitality, and so on — it
can be hard to disentangle and replant the kernels of progressivism
from those discourses and practices. A left agenda of collective
consumption reads for many as uncomfortably close to the lifestyle
politics of those who are ruining cities.
Thus, the call to focus on collectivizing consumption in cities
seems like a slippery slope toward comparing the carbon footprints
of Italian eggplants and rooftop bell peppers while forgetting all
about wages and health care. Isn’t the call to confront the micro-
politics of neighborhoods, and the carbon counts of particular
lifestyles, precisely the kind of downward spiral that grown-up
leftist politics are meant to avoid?
Yes and no. The perils (and promises) of hipsterism are well-
known. Many of those who are sincerely worried about climate
change and eco-apartheid should be considered potential allies,
even if their way of talking about the environment has been
alienating so far. It’s simply inconceivable that in the decades
ahead, as extreme weather devastates more and more of the earth’s
surface, that climate action will keep stalling.
Thus, emissions will be cut, energy used more e#ciently . The
urban spaces that are the concrete terrains of everyday life will
change. The question is who will bear the burdens of compressed
consumption. So it matters who takes charge and what visions are
mobilized. Alliance-building around climate justice to transform
cities presents an opportunity that the Left can’t aﬀord to
squander.
The Left needs to take some of the creativity and alliance-building
behind coalitions like the 350.org “Cowboys and Indians Alliance”
in Nebraska and put it to work in cities and suburbs. Articulating a
connection between older and newer working-class campaigns can
start with broad demands for better-located, cheaper apartments,
shorter work days, better public services.
From the start, these demands implicate the transformation of the
city. Such measures are a socially and politically direct route to
improving workers’ lives — both in the immediate and obvious
sense, and also in the long term by protecting them from extreme
weather.
Of course, building multi-class coalitions around improving urban
life will take hard work. We’ve tried this before. After decades of
gentri!cation battles, the trenches of urban warfare are stubbornly
deep. There are no easy solutions. And middle-class
environmentalists in particular bear a major burden. They need to
show that they really care about people who don’t talk or consume
like them and organize outside their comfort zones. But these
environmentalists also need to keep organizing at home, as it were:
they need to bring their middle-class communities with them into a
broad coalition.
Meanwhile, as tricky as transforming urban cores will be,
analogous eﬀorts will be even harder in North American suburbs,
where for the most part opposition to pro-density developments is
instinctive and vicious.
Most of the world’s city dwellers actually live in suburbs. And it’s
painfully clear from the way suburbs are being densi!ed in North
America (and Europe) that density alone​​ is not a su#cient metric
for success. The dominant form of densi!cation in North America
simply renders the least sustainable forms of urbanism a bit more
e#cient. Walmarts are dropped near a train or bus station and then
surrounded by condo towers.
That’s the same old private wealth, just more tightly packed.
Boredom-driven hyper-consumption won’t slash carbon
emissions. We need to apply the lessons of great urban centers’
appeal beyond their borders.
Denser suburbs need to be imagined and pursued with the same
attention to local democracy, community self-care, and cultural
vitality — advocated, for example, by feminist urban historian
Dolores Hayden — that are found in debates and struggles around
urban cores.
Finally, it’s important to recognize that changing suburban
landscapes is thorny stuﬀ in practice. For decades in the United
States, white supremacist suburban governments kept new
aﬀordable housing projects out of their communities.
This past summer, the Supreme Court !nally ruled against many
such practices, and the federal Department of Housing and Urban
Development recommitted to developing more aﬀordable housing
projects, often serving people of color, in predominantly white,
a$uent suburbs. The reaction from those communities has been
predictably swift and vicious. But committed coalitions could
overcome that resistance.
The alternative to integration, densi!cation, and democratization
is eco-apartheid. Again, in line with the broader message of TCE,
wherever you follow the carbon, you !nd contemporary
capitalism’s most intense social and political fault lines. There can
be no just low-carbon urbanism in the broader American urban
landscape without racial justice. Ultimately, the agenda of the
Black Lives Matter movement in places like Ferguson is as integral
to climate justice as the struggles over aﬀordable housing in
gentrifying urban cores.
There can be no climate justice in poor, racialized communities
where money is raised oﬀ jaywalking !nes and driving tickets,
where public life by people of color is under constant threat from a
militarized police. (In black suburbs they ticket you for jaywalking,
while in Manhattan they repaint roads to encourage white people
to walk wherever they please.)
Only social movements can force governments to raise funds by
taxing income and wealth, and using those funds not to buy guns
and batons, but rather to pay for public transit and high-quality
public amenities that hire local people. There is no separating the
issues of energy e#ciency, repairing the urban fabric, ensuring a
livable everyday life, and the a#rmation that black lives matter. All
these struggles are connected.
The Struggle for Public
Aﬄuence
One bene!t of drilling in on these urban climate politics is that they
help to pinpoint a central tension in Klein’s TCE.
On the one hand, the book is framed in terms of carbon. As Klein
and Bill McKibben love to point out, movements can change social
or economic arrangements, but they can’t change the laws of
physics. Thus, all our politics need to be organized around
reducing the atmosphere’s carbon content to a safe level. And for
both moral and practical reasons, this should be done in a socially
and economically egalitarian way. Fair enough.
But TCE also wields a cultural argument, a kind of localism
blended with a sweeping notion of indigenous values and a less
extractive idea about nature. The centrality of this cultural
framework in Klein’s analysis is questionable.
Sure, in many cases, local is better. The atmosphere isn’t a garbage
dump, and if you can make the point in a spiritually resonant way
all the better. Moreover, as Klein is right to emphasize,  indigenous
movements defending their ancestral lands against the extraction
of fossil fuels have played a massive and critical role in leading the
climate justice movement. The cultural dimensions of these
struggles must be recognized. We can learn a great deal from them.
But we also have to keep following the carbon, as it is embodied in
goods and services, and as it’s emitted in urban areas via car
engines and energy-sucking buildings. TCE doesn’t block that kind
of analysis. But in the book, the emphasis placed on struggles
beyond city limits, in spaces traditionally associated with nature,
leading to a kind of con%ation — rhetorical if not analytic —
between a particular cultural outlook and the broader climate
justice project. In the process, Klein’s book skates over a lot of
urban climate politics.
The result is that we miss an opportunity to join up the
environmental movement’s increasing concern for broader issues
of social justice and already existing poor and working-class
people’s struggles to shape, and to access, high-quality, dense
urban environments. Ecological and social urban struggles remain
conceptually distinct from each other despite their strong
overlaps.
The issues that tend to dominate social justice discussions of urban
environments are those of the disproportionate pollution, toxicity,
and vulnerability to extreme weather that racialized, poor, and
working-class neighborhoods face. Communities facing these
dangers have traditionally been the core of the environmental
justice movement and are now the urban cohort of the climate
justice movement.
These issues, and the struggles facing oﬀ against them, are vitally
important. They are rightly framed as “frontline” struggles in the
battle for climate justice, in analogy with poor, often racialized
communities outside cities who are paying the immediate price for
resource extraction. Klein gives these urban, frontline struggles
prominence in TCE.
I want to draw attention, however, to the equally important but far
less discussed issue of how urban struggles relate to carbon
emissions — the root cause of extreme weather.
The anti-gentri!cation battles against displacement in relatively
dense areas, and !ghts to build new public housing close to mass
transit, jobs, and services — these are struggles whose very core is
a battle for climate justice. Whether those waging that struggle
speak, or even think, in terms of climate change or carbon is not the
issue.
New York’s Crown Heights Tenant Union — a diverse, cross-class
movement of the type Klein wants to celebrate — is a good
example of an implicit and impressive low-carbon urban actor.
Crown Heights is a part of New York that isn’t remotely vulnerable
to rising waters and is not particularly polluted.
But the tenant union, in defending the aﬀordable density of a
culturally rich, dense, well-connected neighborhood against
gentri!cation, is also defending an aﬀordable, small carbon
footprint and building the organizational muscle of a working-
class, urban social movement.
In this way the struggle of the tenant union is a combined climate
and social justice endeavor, and its pursuit of non-reformist
reforms puts both immediate gains, and long-term
transformations, on the agenda. It’s the best kind of battle for
public a$uence.
And yet, neither the tenant union nor many other housing
movements in the US and globally share Klein’s emphasis on the
need to live more harmoniously with nature. But there’s nothing
wrong with that — we don’t need to insist that movements and
communities develop a back-to-nature worldview.
TCE’s broader goal is to mobilize broad, social justice-oriented
coalitions and organizing for fast, quality of life improvements that
build toward replacing the capitalist social, ecological, and
economic system. It’s the right goal.
But — as I suspect Klein would ultimately agree — to reach that
goal doesn’t require getting your hands dirty by kneading the soil;
battling for climate justice doesn’t require that you know the
names of more than two tree species; you don’t need to care about
polar bears or pine beetles. Michel Foucault’s adventures in the
dungeon are as exemplary of low-carbon leisure as John Muir
walking in the woods.
The city-dweller’s !ght for a cheap, decent room, and urban
movements’ struggles for aﬀordable, decent housing close to the
people we love and the things we need — these are frontline
battles in the pursuit of climate justice. To defend a livable home
for humanity, we need to build decent homes for workers.
The new issue of Jacobin, centering on development and
the Global South, is out now. To celebrate its release, new
subscriptions start at only $14.95.
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